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INTRODUCTION
MS. SCHRAG:
Welcome to the final panel discussion of this extraordinary
commemoration weekend. I am Minna Schrag, Chair of the In-
ternational Law Committee at the New York City Bar
Association.
Our discussion is concerned with the application of the Uni-
versal Declaration, especially here in the United States. We are
shifting the focus somewhat from the more theoretical discus-
sions that we had in yesterday's panels to a more concrete level.
Ken Roth will begin by rehearsing for you the history, both
longstanding and recent, of the United States' reluctance to en-
dorse international human rights instruments that give effect
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to the Universal Declaration and its other failings with regard
to international institutions. I think that this discussion will
shed some light on how attitudes in the United States towards
international human rights issues might be changing and
might be changed.
I would like to make a personal observation in exactly this
regard before I introduce the panel. Earlier this week, I was
speaking with some colleagues, experienced and very sophisti-
cated lawyers in New York, leaders in the Bar here in New York
City, on the issue of this conference commemorating the Uni-
versal Declaration, and I am sad to say that not one of them had
ever read it. One of them had a dim sense that it had some-
thing to do with Eleanor Roosevelt.
Now, perhaps you will conclude that I am simply hanging
around with the wrong people. My conclusion is a different one,
and that is that both the American public and, particularly, the
legal profession have to become much, much better informed
about the principles of international human rights. This is cer-
tainly a formidable task, but it is an essential one if the funda-
mental attitudes in the United States that we all deplore are
ever going to be changed.
Now to the panel. Ken Roth is Executive Director of
Human Rights Watch, one of the preeminent human rights or-
ganizations in the world, with extraordinary presence and au-
thority worldwide. Ken, as most of you already know, is a
forceful and eloquent advocate for human rights issues.
Penny Venetis teaches at Rutgers University Law School,
where she runs the Constitutional Litigation Workshop. More
to the point of this morning's panel, she represents several peo-
ple who had sought political asylum in the United States and
had been detained under outrageous conditions by the INS.
Last month, the United States District Court for the District of
New Jersey found that it had jurisdiction under the Alien Tort
Claims Act to hear claims for damages from those detainees,
and the substance of the claims is based, not on domestic
United States law, but on principles of international human
rights law.
I suggest that there are many who would have thought that
such a claim and the arguments on which it is based are un-
thinkable in the United States courts. Plainly, they are not.
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Plainly, there are more chapters to be written in this particular
lawsuit and in the development of this area of law. But it is an
extraordinary accomplishment.
John Martin has had a distinguished career in public ser-
vice as well as in private practice. He has served as an Assis-
tant U.S. Attorney in the U.S. Civil Solicitor General's Office, as
U.S. Attorney here in the Southern District of New York, and as
U.S. District Court Judge in the District of New York.
A couple of years ago, he was confronted with a case
brought under the Alien Tort Claims Act, the Torture Victim
Protection Act, and the national law of Rwanda against a for-
mer Rwandan official. The case was brought by several people
who had lost family members in the recent genocide. In uphold-
ing the claims and in assessing damages on a default judgment,
Judge Martin seriously applied international prohibitions
against genocide and torture.
To say that Ruth Wedgwood is Professor of International
Law at Yale and a Senior Fellow at the Council on International
Relations does not begin to describe her formidable intellect and
ability. She has followed events at the United Nations with
great insight, and her recent piece in the current issue of For-
eign Affairs on the Rome negotiations for the International
Criminal Court is one of the most astute that I have seen. She
will be addressing, in particular, issues arising from the Pi-
nochet matter.
With that, I turn to the panel.
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Kenneth Roth,
Executive Director, Human Rights Watch
I think, if one made a fair assessment of human rights prac-
tices in the United States, one would have to say that, all things
considered, overall we are pretty fortunate. I am going to say
some pretty critical things about the United States in a mo-
ment, but I do not anticipate being arrested at the end of this
conference. I expect Ruth and I will get into a rather heated
debate, and if that somehow comes to blows and I am arrested
on criminal charges, I expect due process. So in that sense, in
some of the basic ways, we do have broad respect for human
rights here in the United States.
You would think that our government could be proud of its
overall record, with the exceptions that I will get into in a mo-
ment. But ironically, the U.S. Government's attitude toward in-
ternational human rights law has been one of utter distrust.
You see this first in how the United States has gone about rati-
fying - or not ratifying - the leading human rights treaties.
Many of them have not been ratified at all. The treaty dealing
with the rights of women,1 the treaty dealing with the rights of
children,2 the treaty dealing with economic, social, and cultural
rights, 3 the leading treaty dealing with humanitarian law or
the laws of war4 - these the United States has not gotten
around to ratifying and, in some cases, there is no prospect of
ratification.
1 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Wo-
men, Dec. 18, 1981, U.N.T.S. No. 20378 Vol. 1249.
2 Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, U.N. GA Doc. A/Res/
44/25 (Dec. 12, 1989).
3 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened
for signature Dec. 16 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976) [herein-
after ICESCRI.
4 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12 1949, Relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), Dec. 12
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 16 I.L.M. 1291).
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Even in the case of the ones that have been ratified, such as
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 5 the
one that in many ways is most like the U.S. Constitution, the
U.S. Government goes about ratification in a rather odd way.
The first thing it does is it sends Justice Department law-
yers to comb through the treaty and to carefully figure out
where the treaty might require the United States to do some-
thing more than U.S. constitutional and statutory law requires.
If there is any greater burden on the United States, the U.S.
government enters what is known as a "Declaration, Reserva-
tion, or Understanding," so that the United States does not
have to change its practices in any way, despite the higher de-
mands of international human rights law.
Then, in case the Justice Department lawyers made a mis-
take, the U.S. government goes one step further and declares
the treaty "non-self-executing," which means that you cannot
simply go into court and state a claim under the treaty; what is
needed is further implementing legislation on the part of Con-
gress in order to give you that formal right to file a lawsuit
under the treaty. But then, Congress never gets around to en-
acting the implementing legislation because the Administration
says, "We already comply with the treaty, so there is no need."
So at the end of this process, ratification turns into a purely
cosmetic gesture, something that says to the rest of the world:
'Yes, we are willing to be part of the international human rights
system;" but that says to Americans, "But, sorry, not for you.
This is not meant to make any difference at all in your rights."
Now, is this just an academic point or does it matter? I
think it matters for two broad sets of reasons.
One is that human rights law, as articulated in interna-
tional treaties, actually gives us greater protection in certain
areas than U.S. constitutional and statutory law. Let me just
give you a few examples here, and then we can discuss at
greater length during the questions.
One clear example is that the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights prohibits the execution of anyone who
was under eighteen at the time that he or she commits an of-
5 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, U.N.T.S. No. 14668,
Vol 999, (1976) G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 I.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N.
Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
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fense, usually murder. The United States, as you know, is one
of the tiny handful of governments around the world that still
executes child offenders. In fact, there have been a few such
executions just in the last-year. This is one of those areas where
the U.S. government carved out an exception and said we would
not be bound by the Covenant. But if the United States took a
more embracing attitude toward human rights treaties, it
would have changed its practice rather than simply shunting
the international standards aside.
Similarly, international human rights law on the question
of discrimination prohibits not only discrimination with dis-
criminatory intent, but also discrimination with discriminatory
effect, obviously a big step beyond U.S. law as it is currently
understood.
To just give you one example where that might make a dif-
ference if the United States were willing to be bound by the
stronger international standards, Human Rights Watch re-
cently put out a study looking at the effect of the law that says
that if you commit a felony, you are disenfranchised, you do not
get to vote. The effect of that law, which is in fact not widely
followed around the world but has become accepted practice in
the United States, has led to the disenfranchisement of up to
one-third of the black male population in several states. Now,
was this intended? You can debate that. Some say actually it
was, but let's leave that aside for a moment.
Clearly, the discriminatory effect, the impact, is so severe
that this practice bears scrutiny. Can you really justify disen-
franchising one-third of the black male population? I would ar-
gue that this presents a serious human rights problem that we
are ignoring because we are not following the international
standards and are simply relying on domestic standards.
Similarly, international standards prohibit not only cruel
and unusual punishment, the standard we are used to thinking
about in our Constitution, but also degrading treatment. What
does that mean? It would have to be litigated, but it means
something less severe than cruel and unusual punishment.
Perhaps that would'give us a better tool to examine things like
the sexual abuse of male and female prisoners that is so perva-
sive in the United States today; or the use of super-maximum
security facilities with prolonged isolation, and inmates locked
1999]
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down twenty-three out of twenty-four hours each day. Things
like that might well be seen as degrading treatment. But under
the "cruel and unusual punishment" test, these practices have
not been deemed abusive.
Now, there are some cases which, even when international
standards use basically the same language as U.S. constitu-
tional or statutory law, there is the possibility that, in an era of
judicial retrenchment, the international standards may actu-
ally provide better protection for Americans than the way the
Supreme Court has interpreted U.S. standards.
Again, I come back to the prison context, where the
Supreme Court has largely abdicated Eighth Amendment "cruel
and unusual" analysis when it comes to prison conditions.
There is very little prospect these days of getting any prison
condition deemed to be cruel and unusual.
As the Supreme Court has been cutting back, wouldn't it
have been great if we could look to international jurisprudence
- the way in which similar language has been interpreted by
the Human Rights Committee, or by other national or interna-
tional courts - as a backstop, something that we could fall back
on, insofar as our domestic remedies became insufficient? This,
particularly in the area of prison conditions, is hardly an aca-
demic point.
Now, let me take a moment and look not only at classic
human rights law as we would think of it as applying to normal
times here in the United States, but also to three developments
in human rights standards and institutions more broadly.
Here, the United States, rather than being a pioneer, has
turned into the principal obstacle to the development of interna-
tional standards and institutions on human rights.
One, which I think you are pretty familiar with, is the issue
of anti-personnel land mines, where the Pentagon simply re-
fused to contemplate banning a weapon system on humanita-
rian grounds. It was terrified at the "slippery slope" that would
be created, this scarey precedent of these humanists coming in
and saying, "No, this weapon system is so awful, it must be
banned. It routinely kills women, children, ordinary civilians,
who innocently step into the woods or their fields, and the mine
in the ground has no idea that it is not an enemy soldier and
[Vol. 11:265
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blows the person up." This happens hourly around the world,
causing tens of thousands of casualties.
Despite this, the Pentagon would not even think of banning
anti-personnel mines. It tried to create an exception for Korea,
but of course its exception would have been followed by every-
body else's exception.
In the end, the United States stood virtually alone in oppos-
ing this treaty. Today, out of all of NATO, the United States is
alone with Turkey in not having ratified the treaty. Out of the
entire European Union, it is alone with Finland. In this entire
hemisphere, it is alone with Cuba in not having ratified this
treaty.
The generals like to talk about, "Oh, if there is an invasion
of Korea, we would need to quickly air-drop a million mines."
But when you talk to generals who are no longer in the Penta-
gon, they scoff at that; they say that is the last thing you would
waste your time doing in the event of an invasion, particularly
with the U.S. force dependent on rapid mobility and air power,
that these land mines are old-fashioned tools that clearly could
be given up in the name of the tremendous humanitarian bene-
fit that would result. But no, this would require a change in
U.S. conduct, and the United States does not like to change its
conduct in response to evolving - let alone existing - human
rights standards.
We saw something similar with the International Criminal
Court this summer, which was overwhelmingly endorsed at a
diplomatic conference in Rome by a vote of 120 to seven. You
know where the United States was on that, along with Iraq,
Libya, China - those longtime defenders of human rights.
The bottom line for the United States was that it did not
want a court that had any possibility, even theoretical, no mat-
ter how remote it might be, of prosecuting an American. It op-
poses a court insofar as that theoretical possibility exists -
despite the fact that the court was explicitly designed to comple-
ment, rather than supersede, national jurisdictions. And so, if
an American airman, for example, committed a war crime by
targeting civilians, or dropping a bomb indiscriminately, there
would be no need for the International Criminal Court to step in
because we would expect the very strong U.S. judiciary to prose-
1999]
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cute that person, since such war crimes are contrary to U.S.
policy.
The ICC would step in only if a national jurisdiction were
unable or unwilling to proceed against its own war criminals,
genocidaires, or those responsible for crimes against humanity.
But even given that strong guarantee against the unjust prose-
cution of an American, the United States opposed the court, and
did it through various schemes, each of which was designed to
preclude even the theoretical possibility of an American being
prosecuted.
It proposed that the Security Council have to authorize any
prosecution, which would have allowed the United States to
veto any prosecution.
It objected to an independent prosecutor who could bring
cases on his or her own. States of course are very reluctant to
charge other states, particularly a superpower, with a crime.
The United States feared that an independent prosecutor might
be more willing to do that.
It objected to the International Criminal Court assuming
jurisdiction over any citizen whose government had not ratified
the ICC. Since Jesse Helms has made clear that the United
States will never ratify the ICC so long as he is around, it was
pretty clear that the United States would be able to avoid juris-
diction if the Rome delegates had accepted the U.S. objection.
Fortunately, they did not.
The bottom line, as far as most of the world was concerned,
is that justice that only reaches some states is not justice. But
the United States, because it could not exempt its own nation-
als, vowed to actively oppose the court.
The final area that I will note is the issue of child soldiers.
There is a campaign right now trying to raise the age at which
people can be used in any military force to eighteen. The Con-
vention on the Rights of the Child treats eighteen as the age of
majority for everything else except for service in armed forces.
There is an effort to add a protocol to that convention that
would raise military service age to eighteen as well.
This is a widely popular move because it would help deal
with a huge problem, the roughly 300,000 children - some-
times as young as eight, ten, eleven - who are serving in
armed forces around the world. These kids not only get killed
[Vol. 11:265270
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very quickly, but they also get utterly destroyed psychologically,
if they happen to survive physically. And they are a terror to
anybody who encounters them. The last thing you want to do is
run into a ten-year-old with an AK-47. They just do not have
the judgment to refrain from committing atrocities that, at least
theoretically, more mature individuals might have.
The United States, though, does not want this proposed
ban on child soldiers because the Pentagon recruits and wants
to continue recruiting seventeen-year-olds. It likes to do this
just as kids are graduating from high school, when some are not
yet eighteen. And even though only 4 percent of the active-duty
recruits are seventeen-year-olds at any given time, the Penta-
gon is unwilling to give up that minor recruitment advantage to
build a strong norm that would help attack the severe humani-
tarian problem of the use of children as soldiers around the
world. Indeed, the U. S. government is actually blocking any-
body else from adopting this norm for fear that it will make the
United States look bad.
And so, even though the Convention on the Rights of the
Child has been ratified by every government in the world, but
for two - Somalia, which has no government, and the United
States - the U.S. government is preventing the rest of the
world from adopting this protocol to their treaty because it fears
political embarrassment. The tool the U.S. government is using
is the U.N. rule of "consensus," which basically gives any coun-
try a veto.
That, once more, shows the lengths to which the U.S. Gov-
ernment will go to avoid changing its conduct in the face of
evolving international standards. It is very similar to the atti-
tude that has prevented the U.S. government from subjecting
itself to existing human rights treaties here at home.
1999]
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Penny Venetis
Rutgers University
The title of this panel, as you all know, is "United States:
Human Rights Leader or Laggard?" Well, you just heard the
bad news.
I just want to echo what Ken said, which is we actually do
have a pretty good deal here, in the fact that we can actually
discuss these things and that we do have a judicial system that
respects the rule of law. That is really what I would like to fo-
cus on.
Ken told you about the bad news and the United States'
failure to take a lead on a political level and enact these very
important treaties. Well, our independent judiciary may be the
counterweight to our politicians failing to take the lead.
Minna mentioned a case that I have worked on, and am
still working on, that I would like to focus on. I would like to
focus on the legal principles that we used in that case to discuss
why I do feel hopeful that the judiciary is a leader, and may
continue to be a leader, in recognizing international human
rights.
For the past three years, the Constitutional Litigation
Clinic at Rutgers Law School has been representing a group of
political asylum seekers who were detained by the INS in Eliza-
beth, New Jersey, in deplorable conditions. My clients are pri-
marily people of color, mostly of African descent, who fled from
their countries fearing for their lives. They were stopped at the
U.S. border because they did not have proper documentation
and were immediately put into jail. But I ask who would have
proper documentation if they were fleeing from their country,
escaping with their lives.
Now, this is supposed to be administrative segregation,
someplace they are detailed while they can actually process
their political asylum claims. Well, it was not administrative
segregation; it was not even jail. It was really atrocious and
horrendous conditions that they endured for eleven months, un-
til they rebelled against those conditions.
13
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I just want to summarize some of the abuses to which they
were subjected:
* They were given dirty, used underwear and clothing that
one of my clients described as "looking as if it had been taken
from the hospital from a dead person."
* They were denied basic amenities, such as toilet paper.
They were given one roll and it had to last for several weeks -
and if they ran out, well, that was just too bad.
* The women were denied sanitary napkins. They were given
one sanitary napkin per day - and, well, if it ran out, they just
had to wait until a guard was kind enough to maybe take pity
on them and give them a new one.
* They were subjected to a constant barrage of racial and eth-
nic epithets and curses, the most common of which was "African
monkey."
o They were housed in filthy, overcrowded rooms, where the
beds were adjacent to toilets and the showers were never cle-
aned, so the entire room stank of human waste.
* They were served rotten food and curdled milk next to the
toilets. The eating areas were inches away from the toilets.
* They were beaten and thrown into solitary confinement at
the whim of abusive and poorly trained guards.
* They were strip searched at random, often they were intimi-
dated with police dogs, and sometimes the searches and the in-
timidations with the dogs were videotaped.
The Constitutional Litigation Center sued the INS, INS of-
ficials, and a private company that was under contract with the
INS to run the detention center.1 This goes back to comments
that were made earlier about corporate responsibility and
whether or not corporations could be held liable for human
rights violations when they are working in concert with govern-
ment violators.
Of course, the defendants in the case all said, "You can't sue
us under international human rights law. The United States
has refused to sign all these wonderful treaties; the Interna-
1 The Company is Correctional Services Corporation, Inc., which was then
known as the Esmor Correctional Services, Inc.
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tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 2 even though the
United States ratified it, is not actually a valid legal document
that advocates could use because there was never enabling leg-
islation enacted, so it really is just a showpiece and a public
relations gesture on behalf of the United States."
The third thing that all the defendants argued was that,
because U.S. law existed that provided remedies for the abuses
that I alleged, that the U.S. law superseded any international
law that might protect my clients.
Well, the defendants lost on almost all of these counts and
we won. It was very, very exciting. This happened in October.
I want to talk about the law that we used in the case, which I
think actually can be applied by other advocates in future cases.
There is something called Customary International Law-
also known as the Law of Nations. This is body of law that the
United States is obligated to follow. All countries are obligated
to follow Customary International Law - not because they have
signed treaties obliging them to do so, but because nations and
courts have determined that there are certain norms of law that
are so universal and so basic to civilized nations that they need
not be codified by any specific treaty.
Of course, it actually helps if there are treaties that embody
the principles that you are advocating, and we cited to many,
many treaties that embodied the norms that we wanted the
court to recognize. But it is not required that the human rights
norms be embodied in a particular treaty or that the nation
against whom you are seeking to enforce the norm ratified any
of the treaties.
U.S. courts have recognized Customary International Law
since the founding of our nation. Actually, this was out of ne-
cessity. When our country was founded, well before we were a
superpower, we needed to establish legitimacy in the world.
One of the ways we did this was to adopt Customary Interna-
tional Law into our federal law. This was an effort to gain the
trust of other nations, to ensure that the United States would
be recognized as a legitimate actor in business transactions or
other transactions that we had with other nations.
2 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, U.N.T.S. No. 14668,
Vol 999, (1976) G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 IN.GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc.
A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
1999]
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Customary International Law has been applied in the
human rights context since 1980, when the Second Circuit de-
cided a landmark case, called Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala.3 In that
case, the Second Circuit recognized torture as a norm of Cus-
tomary International Law and permitted the parents of a
Paraguayan man who had been killed by the military in Para-
guay to sue the torturers and the killers of their son in U.S.
federal court. The statute under which that was brought was
the Alien Tort Claims Act,4 which has been mentioned so far
and I will talk a little bit about in a while.
Since the Filartiga case in 1980, there have been twenty or
so cases in the United States that have reiterated that Custom-
ary International Law is part of our federal law, and have also
recognized that one could sue in the United States for violations
of Customary International Law. There are several noteworthy
cases that I would like to talk about.
One of them is a case called Kadic v. Karadzic,5 which was
decided again by the Second Circuit. This is a case where the
Second Circuit permitted women who had been raped in Bosnia
by the Government of Radovan Karadi to sue in U.S. federal
court for the sexual abuse. The Second Circuit equated mass
rape with a form of torture. This was an extension of the defini-
tion of torture as it is iterated in various human rights
instruments.
Another noteworthy case is a case that has already been
discussed, called Doe v. Unocal.6 You heard Richard Dicker
talk about that case. That is a case pending in California in
federal district court, where the United States holds that a cor-
poration under a contract with the Burmese Government could
be sued for enslaving Burmese laborers in the construction of a
pipeline.
There are several noteworthy aspects of all of the cases that
discuss Customary International Human Rights Law and incor-
porate it into our law, and these are actually very, very signifi-
cant facts. One is that all of the plaintiffs in these cases are
non-U.S. citizens; the human rights violations all occurred
3 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2 d Cir. 1980).
4 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994).
5 Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F. 3d 232 (2nd Cir. 1996).
6 Doe v. Unocal, 27 F. Supp. 2d. 1174 (C. D. Cal. 1998).
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abroad; and all of the victims who sued suffered torture or se-
vere bodily harm. That is a common thread running through all
of these cases.
In a way, it is easy for the U.S. Government and the U.S.
judicial system to say, "Well, wait a second. There are abuses
going on in other countries. This is really awful that people are
being tortured and are being harmed. We will be noble and give
a forum for these claims to be brought."
Our case was different in several respects. One difference
was this was happening on our soil. Another difference was the
people we were suing were U.S. governmental officials as well
as corporations that were under contract with the government
to administer an important U.S. function-the detention of
political asylum seekers and other aliens. The third difference
is that we did not allege that our clients suffered torture or se-
vere physical harm. Rather, we argued the conditions of con-
finement alone were enough to violate international law.
So we had quite a hurdle. We had to convince the court
that it had to take the law one step further and had to find that
Customary International Human Rights Law is not just some-
thing that we apply to violators of human rights in other coun-
tries, that we can actually use it as a tool for violations that
exist in this country.
In our arguments to the court we started with cases dating
back to 1795. There is wonderful language in these early cases
dealing with Customary International Law. It is not in the
human rights context; it is just generally in the context of how
this fits into the law of the United States. As I mentioned, Cus-
tomary International Law was incorporated into U.S. law really
out of necessity in the early days of our country so that we could
be recognized as a legitimate actor and an actor that respects
the rule of law. The other thing about these early cases, and
other cases, including the Filartiga case and subsequent inter-
national human rights cases, is that they all say - and this
comes from the early cases - that Customary International
Law is not static, that it is forever evolving. That is really what
enabled the Second Circuit to recognize rape as a form of tor-
ture and to continue to see that this is a vital, living area of the
law. It makes perfect sense, because certainly the world is not
the same as it was in the 18th century. It also means that Cus-
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tomary International Law takes into account the changes that
occur in the world and also the interrelatedness of various
countries.
We also cited some treaties that embodied the norms that
we were trying to establish. We also cited cases from the Euro-
pean Commission and courts of human rights that actually are
obliged by treaty to follow and adopt these norms. By doing so
we wanted to show that the principles we espoused in our law-
suit exist in treaties, and the actual litigants in other countries
were using these treaties as the basis of lawsuits to protct their
human rights.
We also cited to several cases, including Filartiga and a
wonderful opinion by Judge Weinstein, called Mojica v. Reno,7
which was just affirmed by the Second Circuit. They argued
that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which we are
celebrating today, has evolved from a Utopian model into an ac-
cepted recitation of customary international human rights
norms to which all nations abide.
Judge Debevoise of the U.S. District Court for the District
of New Jersey accepted our arguments. The decision" is novel
in a few ways. One is that, as I said, we sued U.S. entities, U.S.
government officials, and a U.S. corporation. But also, all of the
cases that I mentioned earlier dealt with torture or severe bod-
ily harm, and the court in our case recognized that the right to
be free from inhuman and degrading treatment had another el-
ement to it, the degrading element, which I think Ken men-
tioned before. You do not have to be maimed, you do not have to
be killed, in order to be protected by this norm; if you are sub-
jected to degrading treatment, you also are protected by this
customary international human rights norm.
The Jama court was the first to actually articulate this in
the United States. So, when I think about the future implica-
tions of this decision, I really think about that aspect of the de-
cision that says that you do not need to have someone killed in
order to be protected, or tortured to be protected, by interna-
tional human rights in this country.
7 Mojica v. Reno, 970 F. Supp. 130 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) affd. 157 F. 3d 106 (2 ,d
Cir. 1998).
8 Hawa Abdi Jama et al. v. United States INS et al., 22 F.Supp 2d 353 (D.
N.J. 1998).
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There are some unanswered questions, though. As I say, I
am very hopeful. But there is one thing that I want to come
back to, that all of the plaintiffs in these other cases were all
foreign nationals. There is something called the Alien Tort
Claims Act, which was enacted in 1789. 9 It specifically gives
federal courts jurisdiction to hear claims of Customary Interna-
tional Law violations or violations of treaties in U.S. courts.
So even though there is all this wonderful language dating
back to the 18th century saying that Customary International
Law is part of our federal law, the courts - and the argument
that I made, and that every other advocate has made - is,
"Well, if that is the case, then there is federal question jurisdic-
tion for these cases under 28 U.S.C. § 1331." This is important
because if there is general federal question jurisdiction for these
cases, independent of the Alien Tort Claims Act, then you can
take this decision and use it on behalf of people in the United
States, U.S. citizens (who are not aliens), whose rights are being
violated in the United States. Without that hook, then courts
can say, "The case is not applicable because the Alien Tort
Claims Act only applies to aliens, it does not apply to U.S.
citizens."
So another step is necessary in order for international
human rights law to become even more of a vital component to
expanding individual rights in this country. That step is to
have courts say that there is Section 1331 jurisdiction.
Some courts actually have said that, but it was more of an
aside. They said, "We are not deciding this issue." The Second
Circuit has done it. Judge Debevoise, who decided our case,
also said, "We do not have to reach this issue because we have
jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Claims Act." And some courts
have said, "We think we have jurisdiction under both, but be-
cause the Alien Tort Claims Act applies, we will use that as the
jurisdictional hook." So that is the next step. I hope that other
advocates or the Constitutional Litigation Clinic will take this
next step.
There is actually one case that I wanted to mention that is
a slight disappointment, and that is out of the District of Wash-
ington. It was decided before our case was decided. But it
9 28 U.S.C § 1350 (1994).
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would have been a perfect case for a court to take the lead and
to say that indeed, international human rights law could be
used in the United States not only for aliens but also for U.S.
citizens.
This was a case brought by inmates who were detained in
Washington State who were the subject of nonconsensual medi-
cal experiments while they were detailed. They were injected
with infectious diseases, including syphillis. Such government
activity is clearly prohibited under various .international human
rights norms.
But the court threw their case out and said it did not have
jurisdiction over the international human rights claim under
federal question jurisdiction Section 1331. So that is a disap-
pointing case, but that is just one judge.
The next step is to bring a case with equally compelling
facts in a jurisdiction that has recognized norms of Customary
Human Rights Law but has passed on deciding this issue of
whether the court has both jurisdiction under the Alien Tort
Claims Act and Section 1331 federal question jurisdiction for
such claims. So that is the plan for the future.
I want to make one closing remark. That is that these
cases really demonstrate the beauty of our legal system, which
is the independent judiciary. The Jama case shows that the in-
dependent judiciary is willing to go farther than our political
leaders in recognizing international human rights law and in-
corporating it into our own.
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Honorable John S. Martin, Jr.
United States District Court, S.D.N.Y.
MS. SCHRAG:
I hope that as you are hearing these comments, particularly
some of the very stimulating comments that I certainly heard
from Penny's discussion of her litigation, one might question
the degree to which the judiciary in this country is taking the
lead; or, rather, it is applying what is well-established and
clearly before them applicable law. To that end, before Judge
Martin speaks, I would like to read to you a ringing first para-
graph from the decision that I hope he will discuss with you. He
says:
Presently before the court is a motion for a default judgment in
which the plaintiffs have overwhelmingly established that the de-
fendant has engaged in conduct so inhuman that it is difficult to
conceive of any civil remedy which can begin to compensate the
plaintiffs for their loss or adequately express society's outrage at
the defendant's actions.1
JUDGE MARTIN:
I am happy to be here today, and probably happier than
those of you who came expecting to hear Judge Newman and
find you have to listen to me. All I can do is offer you an apology
and state you are the perfect example of a right without a rem-
edy. While clearly you could maintain a cause of action for neg-
ligent misrepresentation against the organizers of this event,
you would be limited to recovering the price of admission.
When I was asked to pinch-hit for Jon Newman, I said I
was reluctant to appear because I had very little experience
with human rights law. I realized that that was a misstate-
ment because 40 percent of the docket of the federal courts
might legitimately be considered human rights law. Cases in-
volving conditions of confinement, police and prison guard bru-
tality, civil rights violations by the police, and discrimination
1 Mushikiwabo v. Barayagwiza, 1996 WL 164496 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
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claims are human rights claims. Twenty-two percent of the
docket of our court is pro se cases in which individuals are seek-
ing to vindicate their human rights.
While I recognize that these are not the human rights cases
that are the subject of this conference, I mention them because I
think they give a context to what we are discussing today. We
are a nation that cares deeply about human rights and we
devote a substantial portion of our judicial resources to the en-
forcement of human rights. The question is: Will our executive,
legislative, and judicial branches be as willing to make a similar
commitment to the enforcement of international human rights?
Judge Newman would clearly be an appropriate person to
address that issue, since his opinion in Kadic v. Karadzic,
2
which Penny referred to, is one of the most important opinions
in this area. Indeed, without his opinion in that case, and the
opinion of Judge Kaufman in Filartiga,3 the victims of interna-
tional human rights violations attempting to sue in the United
States may find themselves, like you, the possessors of a right
without a remedy.
Judge Kaufman and Judge Newman breathe life into the
Alien Tort Act.4 As Judge Friendly noted in 1975: "This old,
but little used, section is a kind of legal Lohengrin. Although it
has been with us since the first Judiciary Act, no one seems to
know whence it came."5
In their cases, Judges Newman and Kaufman did two im-
portant things. First, they held that the court must interpret
international law, not as it was in 1789, but as it has evolved
and existed among the nations of the world today. Second, they
held that Section 1350 provided both jurisdiction and a cause of
action.
While the Second Circuit's opinions in these two cases ap-
pear to open wide our courts for private actions for violations of
the Law of Nations, it is not at all clear how far our courts will -
and perhaps should - go in expanding these precedents. For
those interested in the enforcement of international human
2 Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F. 3d 232 (2 nd Cir. 1996).
3 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2 nd Cir. 1980).
4 28 U.S.C § 1350 (1994).
5 IT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2nd Cir. 1975).
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rights in our courts, it may be said that easy cases make good
law.
The atrocities committed by the Karadi regime called out
for the remedy which Judge Newman found, as did the cold-
blooded murder of Dr. Filartiga's son.
But those cases pose difficult issues for the judiciary, as is
demonstrated by the three separate opinions of the judges of the
District of Columbia Circuit in the case of Tel-Oren v. The Lib-
yan Arab Republic,6 which involved a suit by families of people
killed in a terrorist attack on a bus by the PLO. Judge Edwards
agreed with the basic principles of Filartiga, but viewed cus-
tomary norms of international law as proscribing only actions of
a state and not an organization, such as the PLO. Judge Robb
affirmed the dismissal of plaintiffs claim for prudential reasons
because he believed they presented nonjusticiable political
questions which would entangle the court in foreign policy is-
sues. Judge Bork expressed similar fears that the court's in-
volvement in such a claim could interfere with American
diplomacy, but he also disagreed with the Second Circuit's deci-
sion that the Alien Tort Act created a private right of action. To
him, the only possible private claims under that Act would be
those that would have existed in 1789 - claims of piracy, viola-
tion of the rights of ambassadors, and violations of the laws of
safe conduct.
There is not time today to get into the merits of the dispute
between the Second and District of Columbia Circuits, but it
should be noted that the issues have not yet been resolved by
the Supreme Court. How the Supreme Court will resolve those
questions may well depend upon the factual context in which
they have been raised.
For example, Minna has told you about the case I had in-
volving the massacre of Tutsi in Rwanda. That was an easy
case. Again, the conduct cried out for a remedy, and there was
no objection to it by the State Department or the Executive
Branch of government.
The only other case I had in this area I dismissed, a claim of
Jewish former residents of Egypt who claimed that Coca-Cola
6 Tel-Oren v. The Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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had illegally leased property expropriated from them as part of
an anti-Semitic campaign of the Egyptian Government.
7
In that case, I was not satisfied that the taking of a citizen's
property was such a clear violation of the Law of Nations that it
was actionable under the Alien Tort Act. In addition, I found
that the plaintiffs claim was barred by the act of state doctrine
that prohibits a court of the United States from reviewing the
legality of the official acts of a foreign nation taken within its
borders.
The interplay of the act of state and the political question
doctrines will continue to play an important role as the courts
struggle to define their role in the enforcement of international
human rights.
Filartiga and Kadic were easy cases because the crimes
were abhorrent and there was no apparent conflict with our for-
eign policy. As Judge Kaufman noted in Filartiga:
For purposes of civil liability, the torturer has become like the pi-
rate and the slave trader before him, hoftis humani generis, an
enemy of all mankind. Our holding today, giving effect to a juris-
dictional provision enacted by our first Congress, is a small, but
important, step in the fulfillment of the ageless dream to free all
people from brutal violence. How far the courts will go to fulfill
that dream remains to be seen.
Before I conclude, I would like to bring your attention to an
important issue presently sub judiciae before my colleague,
John Koeltl. The question is whether someone whose extradi-
tion is sought while in this country may defend upon the
grounds that if extradited he will be subjected to the violation of
the Law of Nations, that is, extrajudicial execution and torture.
The case involves man named Sandu, a Sikh whose extradition
is being sought by India.
Magistrate Judge Francis, sitting as the Committee Magis-
trate, noted that there was in fact reason to believe that he
might be subjected to torture and extrajudicial murder if re-
turned, but said that, under the leading precedent from the Sec-
ond Circuit, the non-inquiry doctrine prohibited him from
looking into that question. He noted the anomaly that, under
Kadic, Sandu's family would have a right to bring a civil action
7 Bigio v. Coca-Cola Company, 1998 WL 293990 (S.D.N.Y.).
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in this country if in fact he was extradited and was tortured and
murdered, but he found that the Second Circuit did not allow
him to consider that issue.
The issue is presently before my colleague, John Koeltl.
Since there is no direct appeal from an extradition order, you
have to proceed by habeas corpus and then you can take the
appeal. I called him yesterday and he refused to give me a hint
of how he was coming out. It will be very interesting to see
what the Second Circuit does with this issue when Sandu gets
there, particularly if Judge Newman is on the panel.
25
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Ruth Wedgwood
Yale Law School
Pinochet and International Law
The Pinochet case has important lessons for how national
courts can be used in prosecution of international human rights
violations. The Pinochet case rocketed to international atten-
tion shortly after the conclusion of the Rome negotiations for a
permanent international criminal court. The complaint filed
against General Augusto Pinochet by Spanish prosecutor
Baltasar Garz6n in October 1998, seeking the former dictator's
extradition from the United Kingdom for the murder of
Spaniards and others in Chile, is an ambitious undertaking.
The potential difficulties surrounding the attempt to extradite
the Chilean leader should be self-evident. Pinochet's Chile was
a close ally of the United Kingdom in its war in 1982 with Ar-
gentina over the Malvinas or Falkland Islands. Many still dis-
dain the political agenda of Salvador Allende, overthrown by
Pinochet in 1973. But the United Kingdom has also sought in
the last several years to be a leader in the negotiations for a
permanent international criminal court. Throughout the Rome
process in 1998, Prime Minister Tony Blair and Foreign Minis-
ter Robin Cook supported creation of a standing structure for
the international prosecution of serious violations of the laws of
war and crimes against humanity. And the Rome statute re-
peats a principle already enunciated in the Security Council
resolutions establishing ad hoc tribunals for Rwanda and the
former Yugoslavia - that office-holding, even as head of state,
does not immunize criminal action.
Pinochet reigned for seventeen years as Chilean head of
state, from 1973 to 1990, following his coup against Salvador
Allende. The Pinochet regime resorted to more than 2,000 ex-
tra-legal executions and disappearances, according to the esti-
mates of Chile's own truth commission.1 Pinochet's tactics were
1 See Ministerio Secretaria General de Gobierno, Secretaria de Comunicaci6n
y Cultura, Informe de la Comisi6n Nacional de Verdad y Reconciliaci6n I, II, III
(Santiago, February 1991). See also Gisela von Muhlenbrock, Reconciliation in
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over the top, in the measure of modern human rights law. Even
for a committed conservative who thinks that the policies of Sal-
vador Allende were anathema to a constitutional free market
regime, Pinochet's methods went well beyond the prerogatives
of sovereignty and decency - using torture and disappearances
to stabilize his regime and eliminate political opposition.
These practices were used against Chileans, but also
against foreign nationals and on foreign territory. Pinochet's
regime authorized the murder of an American citizen, Ronnie
Moffit, who was secretary to the former Chilean foreign minis-
ter Orlando Letelier, in broad daylight in downtown Washing-
ton, D.C., and the extrajudicial execution of an American in
Santiago, Charles Horman. There were extraterritorial killings
in Argentina and Madrid. In Chile, foreign students at the Uni-
versity of Santiago were killed or disappeared, including
Ecuadorians, Mexicans, and a host of Europeans. Victims in-
cluded numerous dual nationals, who were not simply of techni-
cal dual citizenship from some claim rising up through their
great-grandmothers, but who were participating citizens in
other polities. Pinochet is in a peculiar position to question the
assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction, since he was acting off-
shore and against foreign nationals in his prosecution of a law-
less war.
Five years after the coup, an amnesty was instituted in
Chile by the military regime. Yet many of the extrajudicial ex-
ecutions and disappearances occurred even after the 1978 am-
nesty. In 1988, Pinochet, in his puzzling mixture of qualities,
showed he had some more admirable parts and conducted a
democratic plebiscite to declare whether he should continue in
power. He lost the plebescite and then stepped down as Presi-
dent in 1990, but chose to retain his position as Commander in
Chief. Thus, until recently, Pinochet had effective control on
how far the Chilean government could proceed in the resolution
of human rights complaints and prosecution of earlier acts. Pi-
nochet retired in March 1998 as Commander in Chief, and
Chile: Politics and Policies, Feb. 1995 (paper presented at the International Stud-
ies Association); Priscilla B. Hayner, Fifteen Truth Commissions - 1974 to 1994: A
Comparative Study, 16 HuM. RTs. Q. 597 (1994); Mark Ensalaco, Truth Commis-
sions for Chile and El Salvador: A Report and Assessment, 16 HuM. RTs. Q. 656
(1994).
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under the 1980 constitution instituted by his military regime,
became Senator for Life - enjoying a variant of speech-and-de-
bate clause privilege against arrest in Chile as a consequence.
In September 1998, Pinochet flew to London on a visit,
seeking treatment for a bad back. Prosecutions often arise from
serendipitous circumstances, and there are two competing sto-
ries of how Spanish prosecutors were alerted to his presence in
London. One story says that an international news network
mistakenly broadcast an account of Pinochet's passing in two
news cycles. A reporter from The Guardian, an English news-
paper, phoned London hospitals to see where the event had oc-
curred, and discovered Pinochet was alive and well. 2 A
biographical sketch of Pinochet published by The New Yorker in
October 1998 may also have given the tip-off to Spain. An enter-
prising free-lance reporter went out to gather the elegiac remin-
iscences of Pinochet as an old man,3 and this exposed his trips
to London.
In any event, an extradition warrant was filed by Spain
under the European Convention on Extradition.4 The Euro-
pean Community has become deeply integrated, with many
Community-wide conventions, and one country's conduct under
a convention sets a standard for the rest of Europe. So England
had at stake here not only the particular allegations of murder,
torture, and hostage-taking, but also the future of general inter-
national judicial assistance in criminal cases.
2 See Owen Bowcott, Surgery for Chile's Ex-Dictator, The Guardian (U.K.),
Oct. 10, 1998 (Pinochet "reported to be recovering in a London hospital after un-
dergoing surgery."); Matthew Norman, Comment: Diary, The Guardian (U.K.),
Oct. 14, 1998 ("If anyone should know the General's whereabouts, please give us a
call."); Hugh O'Shaughnessy, Comment: A Murderer Among Us, The Guardian
(U.K.), Oct. 15, 1998 ("[H]e slipped through the net on previous visits to this coun-
try.... If this man escapes from Britain once again, a great many people will want
to know why. Irresponsible commentators will cast doubt on the idea of an ethical
foreign policy...."); Duncan Campbell, News in Brief- Call to Detain Pinochet, The
Guardian (U.K.), Oct. 15, 1998 ("The Spanish branch of Interpol has asked its
London counterpart for assistance in locating Pinochet, who is having treatment
for a herniated disc. It is understood the request has been passed to the organised
crime branch of the Metropolitan Police.").
3 Jon Lee Anderson, Profile: The Dictator - Augusto Pinochet ruled Chile
ruthlessly, but he left behind a democracy. Now he wants history's blessing, THE
NEW YORKER, Oct. 19, 1998, at 44 (with photograph of Pinochet in London on Sept.
25, 1998).
4 European Convention on Extradition, Dec. 13, 1957, Europ. TS No. 24, 359
U.N.T.S. 273.
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After the warrant was filed for Pinochet's extradition, a
challenge was mounted in the British High Court of Justice, ar-
guing that Pinochet was immune as a former head of state from
arrest or extradition. 5 The High Court ruled that although
there had been a great deal of development in human rights law
since World War Two, the United Kingdom's State Immunity
Act 6 did not permit the arrest and prosecution of a former head
of state. Many would concede, that in the present state of the
law, current heads of state are immune from arrest in most cir-
cumstances, even though there is no underlying immunity for
the criminal behavior itself. Heads of state are likened to am-
bassadors who enjoy absolute immunity under the Vienna Con-
vention on Diplomatic Relations. 7 Ambassadorial protection
from arrest is not meant to cosset crime, indeed, ambassadors
are required to follow the law of their host country. But immu-
nity during the pendency of a diplomatic posting is designed to
allow the effective conduct of international negotiations and
communication. So too, said the British court, former heads of
state should be immune from the act of arrest. Though former
ambassadors are only entitled to immunity for official acts, the
High Court ruled that the "official acts" of a former head of state
could include even acts that violated the most serious norms of
international human rights law.
In one sense, this was a rather technical holding. It was
the construction of a British statute, which in turn was based
on an analogy to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Rela-
tions. Neither side should exaggerate the precedential effect of
the case, since it treated the meaning of a statute and nothing
more. But the principle used to aid construction of the statute
5 In the Matter of an Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus ad Sub-
jicendum, re: Augusto Pinochet Ugarte; and In the Matter of an Application for
leave to move for Judicial Review Between: The Queen v. Nicholas Evans, Metro-
politan Stipendiary Magistrate, Ronald Bartle, Metropolitan Stipendiary Magis-
trate, and the Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex parte Augusto
Pinochet Ugarte, High Court of Justice, Queen's Bench Division, CO/4074/98, CO/
4083/98, Oct. 28, 1998.
6 State Immunity Act 1978, ch. 33, § 20(1), reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 1123, 1128-
29 (1978) ("Subject to the provisions of this section and to any necessary modifica-
tions, the Diplomatic Privileges Act 1964 shall apply to - (a) sovereign or other
head of State; . . .as it applies to the head of a diplomatic mission . . ").
7 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 UST 3227,
TIAS No. 7,502, 500 UNTS 95.
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may have startled some, when the Lord Chief Justice san-
guinely stated "[A] former head of state is clearly entitled to im-
munity in relation to criminal acts performed in the course of
exercising public functions .... [H]istory shows that it has in-
deed on occasions been state policy to exterminate or to oppress
particular groups.... There is in my judgment no justification
for reading any limitation based on the nature of the crimes
committed into the immunity which exists."8
And then, of course, the appeal came to the House of Lords,
to the Law Lords, no longer wearing wigs, no costume at all,
announcing their decision to an apparently empty chamber.
The Law Lords split in a way that few anticipated - certainly I
did not. Some people supposed that Lord Steyn and Lord Hoff-
mann, as emigr6s from South Africa who knew what repressive
regimes were like, might rule against immunity, although
South Africa did have a Truth Commission instead of criminal
prosecutions as the vehicle of its own transition. Others sup-
posed that Lord Slynn of Hadley might also rule in favor of the
prosecution of Pinochet. Lord Slynn has served as an Advocate
General before the European Court of Justice and is the head of
the British International Law Association - a scholarly inter-
national law association with branches in every country, which
engages in long, compendious deliberations to suggest rules for
maritime neutrality and the like, and which is taken very seri-
ously by courts. But, based on his own analysis of the state of
the law, Lord Slynn ruled in favor of immunity.
Instead, it was Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead who joined
with Lords Steyn and Hoffmann to provide the swing vote
against immunity. By a 3-2 vote, the Law Lords overruled the
High Court of Justice, holding that Pinochet could be returned
to Spain for prosecution on the crimes of torture and hostage
taking.9 Lord Nicholls noted succinctly that
"some acts of a Head of State may fall beyond even the most en-
larged meaning of official acts performed in the exercise of the
8 Id., at 48, 65.
9 Judgments - Regina v. Bartle and the Commissioner of Police for the Me-
tropolis and others, Ex parte Pinochet (on appeal from a Divisional Court of the
Queen's Bench Division); Regina v. Evans and another and the Commissioner of
Police for the Metropolis and others, ex parte Pinochet (on appeal from a Divi-
sional Court of the Queen's Bench Division), House of Lords, Nov. 25, 1998.
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functions of a Head of State.... [W]hy should what was allegedly
done in secret in the torture chambers of Santiago on the orders of
General Pinochet be regarded as official acts? Similarly, why
should the murders and disappearances allegedly perpetrated by
the DINA [Direction de Inteligencia Nacional] in secret on the or-
ders of General Pinochet be regarded as official acts? ... The nor-
mative principles of international law do not require that such
high crimes should be classified as acts performed in the exercise
of the functions of a Head of State."10
By the time of that decision, other European countries had
joined the effort seeking Pinochet's extradition - France,
Belgium, Luxembourg, Sweden, Switzerland - for each country
had become the home of victims of the Pinochet regime, and was
willing to implement universal jurisdiction to vindicate their
claims. Jack Straw, the British Home Secretary, rather point-
edly took no position before the Law Lords and declined the op-
portunity to have his advocate suggest what the legal ruling
should be. Tony Blair's ethical foreign policy became very silent
within the court, deeming the question to be purely a legal one.
Nonetheless, Jack Straw also declined to relieve Pinochet's ex-
tradition on humanitarian grounds of health or old age.
There followed a messy little d6nouement in which the ini-
tial ruling of the Law Lords was challenged on the ground that
Lord Hoffmann had not disclosed that he had some outside affil-
iation with Amnesty International. The Law Lords voted to va-
cate the decision. But on rehearing of the merits, a new panel
reaffirmed crucially that a former head of state does not enjoy
immunity from arrest." The number of charges that could be
brought against Pinochet was limited under the extradition doc-
trine of "mirror offenses" - a criminal charge must be
prosecutable under the law of the requested country (here, the
United Kingdom), as well as the requesting country (Spain), in-
cluding its jurisdictional elements. Hence, the charges on
which Pinochet could be extradited to Spain were limited to
those arising after the United Kingdom created extraterritorial
10 Id.
11 Judgments - Regina v. Bartle and the Commissioner of Police for the Me-
tropolis and others, Ex parte Pinochet (on appeal from a Divisional Court of the
Queen's Bench Division); Regina v. Evans and another and the Commissioner of
Police for the Metropolis and others, ex parte Pinochet (on appeal from a Divi-
sional Court of the Queen's Bench Division), House of Lords, Mar. 24, 1999.
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jurisdiction over hostage-taking and torture within its own law.
But the key principle was reaffirmed without hesitation - a
former head of state does not enjoy immunity under interna-
tional law or under British law from extradition and prosecu-
tion for violations of the international law standards against
hostage-taking and torture.
In legal and political terms, there are several other inter-
esting sides to the Pinochet case. The events show the political
effect of a "human rights diaspora." Pinochet created his own
counter-constituency, by causing over 11 percent of the Chilean
population to emigrate abroad from 1973 to 1990. Over a mil-
lion people were in exile - the equivalent, if it was the United
States, of 20 million people. Those exiles put down roots, partic-
ipated in their new states, and whatever Europe's attitude
might otherwise have been, the Chilean diaspora sustained a
voice throughout Europe in favor of Pinochet's prosecution. Dic-
tators of the future may take heed that they should not be so
brutal as to cause a widespread migration.
Second, if one looks carefully, the capacity to prosecute Pi-
nochet in national courts is not commonplace. There are rela-
tively few countries that have enacted national law provisions
for universal jurisdiction. A handful of countries - Switzer-
land, Austria, Germany, and Denmark - have prosecuted of-
fenders from the Bosnian war,12  and Switzerland has
prosecuted a genocidaire from the Rwandan conflict.13 But rela-
tively few countries, including the United States, have imple-
mented in their national law the full-wingspan of universal
jurisdiction permitted under international law.
In the United States, under the War Crimes Implementa-
tion Act 14 and the Genocide Implementation Act, 15 only where
there is a U.S. victim or a U.S. offender or where the events took
12 The cases are collected in Ruth Wedgwood, National Courts and the Prose-
cution of War Crimes, in SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF INTERNA-
TIONAL CRIMINAL LAw: THE EXPERIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL COURTS
(Gabrielle Kirk MacDonald & Olivia Swaak-Goldman, eds., forthcoming).
13 See Rwanda: Ex-Mayor Gets Life, The New York Times, May 1, 1999, at A6
(Associated Press Report) (Rwandan mayor Fulgence Niyonteze convicted by Swiss
military court for murder, attempted murder, incitement to murder, and war
crimes in the 1994 Rwanda genocide, after seeking asylum in Switzerland).
14 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (1998).
15 18 U.S.C. § 1091(d) (1998).
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place in the United States can a prosecution be brought in fed-
eral courts. U.S. law has not kept pace to allow full implemen-
tation of the jurisdictional principle of universal jurisdiction. If
we caught Pinochet, we could not try him, except for involve-
ment in the deaths of Americans. A number of countries will
want to take a critical look at their national laws.
And some of the countries that have enacted universal ju-
risdiction have not done an effective job. For example, Canada
passed a statute in 1987 to allow Canadian courts to prosecute
any war crimes case permitted under the jurisdictional limits of
international law. 16 In the Finta1 7 case, seven years later, the
statute was hobbled. In Finta, charges were brought against a
Hungarian gendarme who deported Hungarian Jews to Au-
schwitz. The Canadian Supreme Court set an unworkable stan-
dard for the proof of international crimes, requiring that the
offender must have specific intent to violate international law.
As trial lawyers well know, state of mind is elusive and an of-
fender will rarely have international law provably in mind.
The Canadian court also allowed the jury to be presented
with extraordinary defense arguments about the supposed
"good faith" belief of Hungarian political actors at the time -
claiming that Finta could have reasonably believed that Jews
were a national security threat and should be harshly treated. 18
If you allow that kind of extreme jury argument, you are gut-
ting the efficacy of international human rights law. One upshot
of the Pinochet case is to ask all countries to look critically at
how they have implemented universal jurisdiction in their own
laws.
Universal jurisdiction in national courts provides a form of
parallel processing - a horizontal model for the trial of system-
atic human rights violations. The "vertical" model of a perma-
16 Revised Statutes of Canada, 1985, ch. 30, § 1, Sept. 16, 1987 (3d Supp.
1989) (allowing trial of war crimes or crimes against humanity wherever, at the
time of the culpable act or omission, Canada "could, in conformity with interna-
tional law, exercise jurisdiction over the person .. ").
17 Regina v. Finta, [1994] S.C.R. 701, 812 (Can.).
18 See Judith Hippler Bello, Case Report on Regina v. Finta, 90 AM. J. INT'L L.
467, 473 (1996) (Court "may, however inadvertently, have mischaracterized the
requisite elements of international crimes" and "sterilized whatever prosecutorial
value remained" by allowing Finta to present defense based on claimed belief that
Hungarian Jews "were subversive and disloyal to the war efforts of Hungary.").
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nent international criminal court or ad hoc international
tribunals will be strengthened by this alternative. There is suf-
ficient development in the implementation of human rights
treaties and anti-terrorism treaties through national courts
that one can recognize this alternative modality of prosecuting
human rights violations.
The third interesting feature of the Pinochet case is the
problem of amnesties and transition. Most political observers of
Chile believe that the country is stable enough to withstand a
prosecution that takes place abroad. The military no longer
seeks a prominent role in politics; there have been many retire-
ments in the officer corps, and participation in international
peacekeeping has liberalized the general attitudes of the Chil-
ean military. 19 The danger of the Chilean armed forces acting
against the current democratic regime is minimal. Chile's long-
term economic prosperity has also bolstered democracy. Any
destabilization would sour economic growth, just as Paraguay's
commercial ambitions within MERCOSUR were used to per-
suade the Paraguayan military to avoid a barracks coup several
years ago. There can be a civilizing effect of commerce.
But one must take the danger of instability as a serious is-
sue in each case. If proceeding against Pinochet might uproot
Chilean democracy and cause a reversion to military rule, that
is a profound consideration for any foreign court and any inter-
national criminal court. One cannot be blind to competing equi-
ties. The United Nations Security Council does not act to
guarantee the stability of all democratic regimes. The competi-
tion between justice and peace requires a prudent judgment in
each and every case.
The fourth lesson of the Pinochet affair is the vagary of poli-
tics - that you have to do politics to implement the law. The
Pinochet case was touch and go. Former Prime Minister Mar-
garet Thatcher does have tea with Pinochet. Britain does owe
Chile a debt of gratitude, from Britain's point of view, for its
assistance in the Malvinas War in 1982. Chile reportedly
shared intelligence information on troop movements and mari-
time movements. Helicopters operated by the British in Argen-
19 But see Brian Loveman, Antipolitics in Chile, 1973-94, in THE POLITICS OF
ANTIPOLITICS-THE MILITARY IN LATIN AMERICA 268 (Brian Loveman & Thomas M.
Davies, Jr., eds., 1994).
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tina were refueled in Chile before they went back to the
Falklands. The more recent history of cooperation between
Britain and Chile has included military affairs, as well as pros-
perous trade relations.
Some in Chile have felt that a prosecution such as this
would not be mounted against the leader of a larger country,
and thus, whatever Pinochet's sins, the case represents an as-
persion against Chilean sovereignty. Others judge that the is-
sues of transition are solely for Chile to handle. Decisions are
going to be hard. And indeed, were it not for some of the events
of the moment, I am not sure how the Pinochet matter would
have come out. As it happens, the United Kingdom has been
eager to participate in the leadership of Europe and to cham-
pion the "like-minded" states' interest in the ethical elements of
foreign policy.
But if you look at the case of Abdullah Ocalan, the Kurdish
terrorist arrested in Nairobi, one can see the possible con-
straining effects of politics. Ocalan was first arrested in Italy,
and his extradition was requested by Turkey for the murder of
Turkish civilians. Any sympathy for Kurdish political claims
does not change the legal significance of Ocalan's acts against
civilians. Italy ruled that it could not extradite Ocalan to Tur-
key as a country that might impose the death penalty. Next,
Germany refused to request the extradition of Ocalan, arguing
that his arrest would cause internal instability. Germany has
hundreds of thousands of Kurds and Turks within its borders as
guest workers and citizens, and the prospect of internal violence
was unnerving. 20
Ocalan was finally arrested in Kenya, in an operation
whose sponsorship was left deliberately vague. There were
demonstrations across Europe, and some incidents of violence.
Ocalan's transcontinental trek reminds us that there are real
problems of politics, concerns about domestic tranquility, even
20 See Schroeder Tells Italy Germany Won't Take Ocalan, Reuters, Nov. 27,
1998 (German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder stated "'I have asked the Italian
Prime Minister for his understanding that we will not make a request for extradi-
tion. This is because we are the country in Europe with the most Kurds - often
refugees - and Turkish citizens who live here. We are interested in protect[ing]
the peace in Germany.'"); compare Tom Buerkle, German Aide Hails Arrest of Pi-
nochet, Int'l Herald Trib. Oct. 30, 1998 (Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer stated
that Pinochet arrest "has set a cornerstone of international law.").
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concerns about commercial ties, that will be weighed against
war crimes prosecutions. One will have to hand-tailor every
case.
The final issue is the most technical, but perhaps the most
profound. This is the need for sage judgment in how fast to push
the development of the law. Customary law is based on state
practice as well as legal opinion. The gymnasium scholars who
write compendious treatises on international law may seem un-
charismatic to some American academics. But the purpose of
having these rather clinical assessments - old-fashioned works
of encyclopedaic wissenschaft - is to take objective account of
state practice, to see where state practice has gotten to in rela-
tion to reformist aspirations. If international law does not
ground itself in state consent, it will just be a form of preaching.
There is a need to be careful in how one elides from "ought"
to "is" in pronouncements of new international law. In Pi-
nochet, of course, the Law Lords were merely construing a Brit-
ish jurisdictional statute. But their interpretation of the
statute was informed by a reading of international law. One
needs to maintain a rigorous split sensibility: taking account of
where one wants to get to, but also recognizing the limits of cur-
rent state practice. Otherwise, customary law will lose its
claim of legitimacy, founded on state consent. One wants to be
able to say to people who brandish state sovereignty that cus-
tomary law is as surely footed on state consent as is treaty law.
But that requires a self-denying judgment about what states
have done and are willing to do.
If you read the majority opinions of the Law Lords, what
they say is, "Yes, the whole trend of international law is in this
direction. Holding office, even as a head of state, does not sani-
tize or immunize a criminal act." But if you read the High
Court opinion of Chief Justice Bingham or the dissenting Law
Lords, they make an equally conscientious argument, saying es-
sentially that the circle is not yet squared, that the treaties with
universal jurisdiction do not provide for withdrawal of immu-
nity from heads of state or former heads of state. And treaties
withdrawing immunity from heads of state do not provide for
universal jurisdiction.' In the view of the dissenters in the Pi-
nochet adjudication, there are tortoise-and-hare races in inter-
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national human rights law and international jurisdiction that
have not yet been won.
There is a virtue in taking matters deliberately - with
principled "ad hoc'ery" - to create the political culture to sus-
tain human rights claims. One cannot look at this simply as
technical questions of law; one has to take account of real-life
problems - the concerns of facilitating international relations
by allowing free travel by heads of state, and encouraging auto-
crats to step down from power through the possibility of a safe
d6nouement. It may be that there is an "optimal" rate of prose-
cution - targeting enough defendants so that human rights vi-
olators think twice about the future, but at a pace that also
allows dictators to suppose that peaceful retirement is a
possibility.
Still and all, the Pinochet case, from the prosecutor's point
of view, provides a powerful record of salient facts. Spain can
proceed on a conservative as well as innovative theory of prose-
cution, vindicating the deaths of its own nationals as well as
Chileans. The events of the regime were famous and the doc-
trine of command responsibility is settled in the law. If divine
providence is recognized as an active element in historical and
legal evolution, the occurrence of Pinochet's bad back is a chiro-
practic god's delight.
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QUESTIONS AND COMMENTS
Q [Prof. Sohn]:
I would like to make two comments on things that could
have been mentioned perhaps today but were not.
The first one is the consequence that the states have now
for quite a number of years applied in the treatment of prison-
ers the United Nations Rules on the Treatment of Prisoners.
People do not know perhaps that there is a United Nations
conference meeting every two years on international criminal
law, that has been very active in the decision in Rome. They go
very carefully through the laws of various countries and try to
establish the basic principles. They are not conventions; they
are not even declarations. They are simply guiding principles
for people who deal with prisoners.
Some American lawyers discovered those things and
started relying on them, especially in the courts of the states -
I do not think there have been federal cases, but there are state
cases - in which the attorneys were smart enough to say, "The
treatment of these prisoners by the state has been far below in-
ternational standards." The judge says, "Where are those inter-
national standards?" "Here is something that was adopted,
usually in a place in Sicily or other places in Italy, by an inter-
national group, was approved then by the General Assembly,
and at least recommended to the states to apply." The judge
says, "It is reasonable; I am going to apply it." One judge did
not. Other judges have done in quite a number of cases.
So this is another good example of international legislation
simply by writing reasonable rules, if you like. People then de-
cide, "Yes, this has become by now Customary International
Law that everybody can apply for treatment." That is one point.
The second point, I would like to come to a little defense of
the United States Government, in particular to President Ei-
senhower, who was maligned yesterday by saying that he ended
abruptly the career of Mrs. Roosevelt by saying that she was no
longer going to be the United States representative on the
Human Rights Committee. But he had to appoint somebody
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else, and he appointed Mrs. Osgood Lord, and, to make it even
worse, asked her on her first visit to the United Nations Com-
mittee to announce that the United States from now on is not
going to work on the covenants, the covenants are not neces-
sary, the Universal Declaration is sufficient, and therefore the
United States should not waste the time of its officials to par-
ticipate in any further drafting of covenants.
After going to the United Nations, the poor lady goes back
home and says, "We have to do something to change the atmos-
phere at the Human Rights Commission. What are we going to
do?" She said, "Let's recommend that all states should report to
the United Nations how they apply the Declaration, because we
agreed that the Declaration is an effective document, even if it
is not really binding, and therefore the states should apply it."
As a result, she came to the United States saying that every
state should annually report what they have done to implement
the Declaration in their countries. Of course, there was some
opposition, like from the Soviet Union in particular, but, after
two years' discussion, it was agreed. Therefore, the Commis-
sion in effect would have reports on the Declaration from its
members.
Some twenty-seven out of thirty-seven states actually com-
plied, including the United States. And what is fascinating for
me, because I am interested in economic and social rights, is the
United States reported not only on the first five articles of the
Declaration, but on all articles of the Declaration. That was the
first thing.
The Commission appointed a working group and presented
a report saying that quite a number of states complied, but their
replies were quite different. They established certain rules
which should be observed by states in those reports.
The second time, fifty-one states presented, again the
United States, and so on. And then, we had to appoint a Special
Committee, meeting for several weeks before the Human Rights
Committee, to look through those reports and give some conclu-
sions that then the Commission could adopt, and they then sent
it over to the Economic and Social Council and they adopted it.
It is fascinating that the United States for all those years
was sending reports on the subject, very meticulously. They are
good reports, not only as it relates to the basic document and
[Vol. 11:299300
40http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol11/iss1/9
U.S. - LEADER OR LAGGARD?
the citations, but the summary of those reports in general. You
might like to go look at them. In those files are the reports by
the United States.
A crisis came when the Covenants finally, in 1976, came
into effect. Some smart person in the Justice Department said,
"Of course the United States is going to ratify the Covenants,
although it did not participate in their drafting, because they
are simply implementations of the Declaration." Therefore,
they discontinued those annual reports, and they suggested to
the General Assembly that it was reasonable that the reports
should be stopped.
If I had had time yesterday - which I limited myself only
to twenty minutes, as everybody was supposed to - I would
have proposed that the United States can repeat what they
have done before. I would suggest that countries that do pres-
ent reports to the United Nations on the Covenants should pres-
ent reports on the Declaration. A very simple proposal. Maybe
somebody might print it.
MS. SCHRAG:
Thank you, Professor Sohn. I must say you have once again
demonstrated what someone - I can't remember; perhaps it
was Professor Meron - said yesterday, that you have been the
teacher of us all. Thank you for that provocative idea.
I would also like to add one comment, if I can be permitted
the privilege as moderator, to your first comment. That is, I am
aware of domestic advocacy organizations. At the one with
which I am particularly associated, the NOW Legal Defense
and Education Fund, our staff is now preparing itself in its ar-
guments on domestic litigations to cite to international law as a
means to persuade the courts. It is my sense that this is just
the beginning of what may become much more widespread.
Q [Prof. Nagan]:
Just a comment and a few questions, [first, with respect to]
Ruth Wedgewood's assessment of the Pinochet problem. Let me
say, quite bluntly, I take objection to some of the points that she
holds strongly.
You used the words on several occasions, "dirty war." It is
not a neutral term, and it reflects some of the problems in Uru-
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guay and some of the problems in Argentina, where the justifi-
cations for using these unrestrained methods of repression were
tied to the notion that the other side was vicious.
In the context of Chile, you had destabilization of a demo-
cratically elected regime. This is quite different from the partic-
ular context. More than that, there was the rather sordid role
of the United States involved in the destabilization of the econ-
omy of Chile. I remind all of you of Henry Kissinger's own fa-
mous statement, that "it was a really terrible thing and quite
irresponsible for the Chilean people to have elected a socialist
regime."
So really the circumstances are quite different, and one has
to be very cautious about the morality one attaches to statecraft
in these kinds of contexts. It is not neutral. It does put a con-
textual gloss on what has been put forward.
With respect to Mr. Roth, I must say mea culpa. He made a
comment on the question of self-executing of human rights trea-
ties. I was the character that negotiated the Torture Conven-
tion and the related components of the Civil and Political Rights
Convention.
My colleagues took a very strong stand on the same princi-
ple as you did. I did not. I actually still think, at least in the-
ory, that bringing the full weight of the Congress to bear on
implementing legislation strengthens, rather than weakens, the
framework of human rights culture in American society. The
flaw lies in the unwillingness of NGOs to follow through on that
process. The history of human rights in the Congress has
shown far more promise in the full Congress of the United
States than in trying to get a two-thirds blocking majority in
the Senate.
Regrettably, the story behind this is a bit of an accident,
because when we got the chance to stick the Torture Convention
onto the agenda, it came on as a tag onto aid to the Soviet
Union. There was a boycott of the Republicans on the aid to the
Soviet Union because they did not get enough notice. When
they finished that, they said, "What else is there on the
agenda?" We said, "The Torture Convention." So they voted it
up with no mark-up, so none of us knew exactly what it is that
went through. None of us had the courage to go and say: "You
didn't mark this thing up. Let's go muck around with it after-
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wards." We had a greater concern getting it through, even if it
was not exactly an ideal package. Regrettably, it was by some
degree of accident, I am sorry to say, so I make a bit of mea
culpa here.
My question to the Judge is with respect to the Judge
Walker-issue of the notion that one has to look at the Alien Tort
Claims Act in terms of the law of 1789. I wonder if you would
answer the question as to how the Rules of Civil Procedure have
effected the interpretation of substantive causes of action over
time. I am referring, of course, to the fact that in 1789 we have
forms of action; later, through the influence of the Field Code,
we had the code system of pleadings. Then, afterwards, during
the 1930s, we had the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure with a
very different conception of "a claim upon which relief can be
granted." My sense is that both are standard procedure, but I
would like your comment.
JUDGE MARTIN:
I do not think it is a procedural question; I think it is a
substantive question. Remember that treaties are not self-exe-
cuting - somehow, somebody has got to create the right to sue.
Judge Kaufman I think took a big leap.
Now you have that same debate going on in our own consti-
tutional debates as to whether we are stuck with what the
Founders wanted in the Constitution; or are they living docu-
ments that will be interpreted, the Brennan approach.
Q [Prof. Nagan]:
But they come through route ex culpe. They have to meet
the standards of the rules.
JUDGE MARTIN:
But the pleading has to set forth the facts that establish
that you have a cause of action that has been established by
Congress, if you are dealing with the federal law. Judge Bork's
issue was it is not because that was not the time. It was Judge
Friendly who said, "This is an Act that has never been used."
All of a sudden, Irving Kaufman grabbed it and did something
with it.
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I am not objecting to what he did, but I think it is important
to keep in mind, as this area of litigation goes forward, that
you've got to be careful how far it gets pushed, particularly
before it gets reviewed by the Supreme Court.
I spent two years in the Solicitor General's office, where we
were very careful about trying to decide what cases went to the
Supreme Court so you got the right case to decide the facts. A
great book I recommend to everybody is Simple Justice, the
story of the whole background of Brown v. Board of Education,1
which shows how carefully crafted those cases were to keep
building on one another so that you could keep making good
law.
I think there is a danger in some of this as it gets litigated
if the wrong case gets to the Supreme Court. Then, perhaps,
Bork and not Kaufman will prevail.
PROF. VENETIS:
I just want to comment also on the comment that you made.
Actually, the Judge Bork opinion has been discredited by every
single court since then. In addition, the U.S. Congress has also
discredited it. When the U.S. Congress enacted the Torture
Victim Protection Act, which basically gives U.S. citizens
abroad the same rights that the Filartiga2 cases gave to aliens,
the U.S. Congress specifically said, "We do not follow Judge
Bork's decision in Tel-Oren.3 We incorporate Filartiga and its
progeny in the interpretation of the Torture Victim Protection
Act." So you have the U.S. Congress recognizing that Custom-
ary International Law evolves.
It is kind of interesting that our government takes a dual
position, because our government has submitted various amicus
briefs saying that Customary International Law exists and is
alive and well, in the case United States v. Iran. And then, in
these cases that are now being brought domestically, where the
U.S. Government is submitting amicus briefs, or actually is a
litigant in the case, it is saying, "Well, wait a second. This
doesn't apply to us." So you can actually use the U.S. Govern-
1 RicHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (1977).
2 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d. 876 (2nd Cir. 1980).
3 Tel-Oren v. The Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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ment's own words that have been made in these foreign cases
against them domestically.
Again, the courts have to figure out what to do with it. I
think several people have commented how quickly should this
move, how do courts recognize international norms, and does
that at all dilute the concept of what a norm is if you have too
many courts commenting on it.
MS. SCHRAG:
I think we have time for one more question.
Q: Two particular things I would like to comment on.
No one mentioned how in Europe - [whether] in France,
Britain, wherever - if you are in one of those courts and your
human rights are abrogated in any way, you are out of that do-
mestic court system and into the European Commission on
Human Rights. If that does not resolve it, then you have access
to a court, the European Human Rights Court. In this country
we have no such avenue. Their experience with Nazi Germany
put them in that position, where that is how they deal with ab-
rogation of their rights in the court.
I guess what I am trying to say is judges are put into place,
very much in the same way that our politicians are put into
place, by campaign finance.
JUDGE MARTIN: I never contributed a nickel.
Q: Well, the point is that you have corruption in these courts.
What I also suggest is that it is just a little bit too aca-
demic. I think you need to have an assistant who is very nonde-
script, send them into these courts. If you go in yourself, the
judge is going to follow the Constitution, et cetera. But from
what I can see, you are speaking about human rights, and we do
not have constitutional courts. So I suggest that we get some-
one that would sort of blend in to go to these courts and see
what is really going on. Some of the things under the Pataki
and Giuliani administration[s], where they are placing the
judges, they are atrocious.
Families are being abducted, there is torture, there is mur-
der, on the behalf of landlords. There are 50,000 children
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through the ACS getting foster care, and that is essentially an
extortion system.
My question to you is to comment on what Europe does in
terms of protecting human rights.
And also, no one has mentioned the Inter-American Com-
mission on Human Rights. Reagan was the only President, if I
am correct, who ratified the Convention on the Rights and Du-
ties of Man. So there is some recourse in terms of the Inter-
American Commission on Costa Rica, the human rights courts,
the State Department notified, and then of course the Congress
had to respond, where I am not sure there is any teeth into that.
MS. SCHRAG:
Thank you for those comments. I think one implicit re-
sponse already to part of your question has been the kind of
litigation that Penny described that she brought. Again, it is
the theme of this weekend, which is importing the principles of
the Universal Declaration into our domestic arena.
Does anyone else on the panel want to respond to those
questions?
PROF. ROTH:
I can respond quickly. You are right, the United States has
not allowed itself to be subject to any international jurisdiction
comparable to the European Court. We have not allowed claims
to be stated by individuals before the Human Rights Commit-
tee, which is what enforces the international Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights. We have not submitted to the compulsory
jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court on Human Rights. So
it is just more of the same.
I mean, we do not even allow our own judges to apply inter-
national human rights law. The best that can be done, as some-
body over here argued - Professor Sohn said that yes, of course
you can cite treaties as persuasive authority. You can say, "The
European Court interpreted this provision this way. Why don't
you interpret a U.S. provision similarly?" Those arguments are
certainly worth making, but that is very different from being to
state a claim under the treaty that any judge, American or
otherwise, could then look at. That you cannot do right now.
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PROF. VENETIS:
Also, the points that you make are precisely the reason that
we need to import international law into our own. I think Ken
commented on this as well. Our Constitution, in the way it has
been interpreted, no longer deals with a lot of problems that
exist in society. [Further], if we inject into our system this new
body of Customary International Law, then perhaps in inter-
preting those provisions where the courts are not bound by bad
Supreme Court precedent they can create new, more protective
law.
MS. SCHRAG: Ruth, do you want to have the last word?
MS. WEDGWOOD:
Just an old prosecutor's joke, since we all lived through the
transition from John Martin to Rudy Giuliani as U.S. Attorney
in the Southern District of New York. I am not sure that inter-
national law is going to be what makes any particular difference
in the mayoral powers in New York City.
But on a serious note, the theory of the U.S. Constitution is
every court is a constitutional court. There is not a separation
between courts of law and courts of constitution, so every court
should be applying the federal and state constitution in applica-
ble cases.
Where I do think, though, we may be impatient is that as
much can be done through comparative constitutional law as
through direct application of international law. In a way, this is
an interesting epiphenomenon of our parochial law reporting
system. Heretofore there has not really been a trans-European,
Euro-Atlantic, Euro-Asian constitutional law reporting system.
One court is not really aware of what another country's courts
are doing.
As that changes, with the Internet and database and trans-
lation -and, frankly, as English becomes the culturally hege-
monic language throughout Europe - American courts will
become much more aware of what the Hungarian constitutional
court is doing or the German constitutional court is doing. Then
fit] doesn't have to think about it as a hierarchical subordina-
tion to international law, but simply best practices -looking at
what other countries' constitutional courts have done and
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choosing voluntarily to do likewise in the interpretation of our
Constitution.
The signal case for all of us, and it is at the beginning of
Louis Sohn's great red casebook on international human rights
law - which should be reprinted sometime - are the Califor-
nia Fuji cases. [They are] the Japanese land law cases, where
the California Supreme Court did not want to suppose that the
U.N. Charter would be directly self-executing, but did radically
reinterpret the Fourteenth Amendment to forbid alien land dis-
crimination to allow Japanese immigrants and nationals to own
land in California.
That political object lesson from the early 1950s might be
taken by us all that even though it is less observable, it is more
sinuous. But the incentive for reinterpretation of domestic law
in light of international law and other countries' constitutional
practice is something that I think will reward us an alternative
form of argument.
MS. SCHRAG: Thank you very much.
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